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District
Chief John F. Sullivan—On Behalf of Six Brothers
Article by: Todd Eddy
On December 3, 1999, the lives
of District Chief John F. Sullivan, the Worcester Fire
Department, and the entire fire service were forever
changed. Chief Sullivan, known as Sullie to his friends, was
a Lieutenant on Engine Company 3 on the night when six of
our brother firefighters made the ultimate sacrifice in the
Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse fire.
Chief Sullivan describes
himself as a storyteller. I would consider that an
understatement. Four hours passed as he spoke for what
seemed like only 30 minutes at the 2008 Fire Chiefs
Conference in Tuscaloosa. I could have heard a pin drop as
he walked the conference attendees through the city of
Worcester and its history. We learned the history of the
Worcester Fire Department and the Worcester Cold Storage and
Warehouse building. He described the fire toward the end of
his story when most would consider that the beginning. That
was because he wanted everyone to understand the mindset of
the firefighters that took on the fire that night.
Some 85–89 percent of structure
fires fought in the United States are residential. They
account for the majority of firefighter fatalities. But, as
Chief Sullivan pointed out, the fires that can take several
firefighters at once are the fires in commercial structures.
He put into words a concept
that all firefighters know but probably haven’t thought of
quite this way. He pointed out that every fire department
has its “common structure,” the type structure most common
in a fire department’s coverage area. For some it may be a
ranch-style house or the proverbial shotgun house. It is the
structure in which firefighters can fight a fire in their
sleep because that is what they cut their teeth on. It is
the structure that makes firefighters smile when they pull
into the front yard to flames because they have fought fire
after fire in them.
For Worcester, the common
structure is the “three-decker.” This is a three-story house
that Chief Sullivan described as three ranch houses stacked
on top of each other. This is the structure scattered
throughout Worcester that the firefighters had figured down
to the last detail how to fight a fire in. It was this type
structure that was on the minds of the firefighters headed
to the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse that night.
The fundamental difference
between the three-decker and the warehouse is building
openings. Anywhere in a three-decker, a firefighter can
quickly and easily find egress because of the numerous
windows and porches in the design. In the warehouse,
building openings were few. The first arriving commander
knew the only utility on the building was a power supply to
an advertising billboard on the roof. The smoke coming from
the roof led him to believe the fire could be involving that
power supply. He called for aerials to ladder the building,
and crews went to investigate.
As the crews were on the roof
reporting that the smoke was coming from the elevator shaft,
the call came in that began the events that led to tragedy.
A caller reported that homeless people were living in the
building. The focus changed from extinguishing a fire in a
vacant building to rescue.
A crew of two from the roof
began a search downward through the building and the crews
on the ground began a search upward. As the search and the
fire continued, the crew that entered from the roof started
to run low on air. In a three-decker, that would mean a
simple exit and bottle swap. In the middle of a windowless
building, it spelled disaster.
Because there were no windows
on the outside to use for counting the floors, firefighters
on the outside were confused about the number of floors in
the building. That led to confusion about what floor the
missing firefighters were actually lost on.
The confusion cost the lives of
four additional firefighters trying to find their brothers.
The layout and construction of the warehouse, the lack of a
functional protection system, and the fire burning unnoticed
for at least an hour before the fire department’s arrival
all contributed to the tragedy that night.
Chief Sullivan’s goal is to
share the lessons he and his brothers learned with all
firefighters that will listen. He is doing it to represent
the six brothers we all lost that night. Here are a few of
the lessons he shared with attendees at the conference:
·
We
can’t use emergency structure fires as training tools. Don’t
let firefighters keep offensively fighting a lost-cause fire
just to get some experience. That is for the training
grounds.
·
Have
guidelines in place for commercial structure fires. Waiting
for the low air alarm to exit a large structure is too late.
Chief Sullivan suggested a guideline of beginning egress
when you have 50 percent of your air left.
·
Remember that the building is being demolished as you are
walking in the door. Know when to order evacuation, and
avoid the macho attitude of “we got it.”
·
Know
the structures in your area. Three of the six floors in the
Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse had only one means of
egress. The insulation for the cold storage was
asphalt-impregnated cork covered with polystyrene,
polyurethane, and fiberglass board. It was, in fact, a
firefighter death trap.
·
Determine air consumption rates for all firefighters in your
department. All firefighters should know how long their air
will last during suppression efforts. The person responsible
for accountability should know the consumption rates of the
interior firefighters.
For the NIOSH recommendations
and a full report go to
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9947.html.
Chief John F. Sullivan’s
presentation and this article are dedicated to our six brave
brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice trying to save the
lives of others.
The Worcester Six
Paul A Brotherton
Timothy P. Jackson
Jeremiah M. Lucey
James
F. “Jay” Lyons III
Joseph T. McGuirk
Lt.
Thomas E. Spencer
http://www.fallen-heroes.org/
2/15/08
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